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Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings
By PETER R. SILTEN* and RIcHARD TULLIS**
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense,
and before his arraignment he becomes absolutely mad, he ought
not by law to be arraigned during such his phrenzy, but be remitted
to prison until that incapacity be removed; the reason is, because
he cannot advisedly plead to the indictment.... And if such per-
son after his plea, and before his trial, become of non sane memory,
he shall not be tried; or, if after his trial he become of non sane
memory, he shall not receive judgment; or, if after judgment he
become of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for
were he of sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of
judgment of execution.' ,
It is a basic principle of due process that a defendant cannot be
tried for a crime while he is mentally incompetent. This rule is de-
rived from the common law prohibition against trials in absentia.2
Though the mentally incompetent defendant is present in the court-
room, he is, in reality, afforded no opportunity to defend himself.
The mentally incompetent defendant is usually a person suffering
from a "mental illness."3  But mental incompetency may result from
* A.B., 1970, University of California, Santa Cruz; J.D., 1974, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law; Member of the California Bar.
** A.B., 1968, San Francisco State University; J.D., 1973, University of San
Francisco School of Law; Member of the California Bar.
1. 1 HALE, HISTORA PLAcrroRUM CORONAE 34-35 (1736) (citation omitted).
2. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975).
3. "Turning to the medical profession to define 'mental illness' for us, we find
no clear answer. A century ago, 'mental disease' was a fairly clear concept; all such
disease was thought to be the product of lesions in the brain. Today, psychiatrists
recognize that many mental disorders seem to be wholly functional; a postmortem
examination shows no organic pathology of any kind. So long as organic pathology was
assumed to be involved, it was possible to regard the mentally ill as clearly distinct from
those who were 'sane.' But since the recognition of functional disorders, and especially
since Freud, the view that there is a clear, qualitive division between the sane and the
mentally ill has largely been abandoned in favor of the quantitative view, that there is no
such clear line between the two; there is rather an unbroken continuum from normal to
abnormal. But if there is no longer merely black and white, but a continuous shading
from one to the other, it becomes apparent that asking the medical expert where he
draws the line between two shades of gray is not quite like asking him whether a bone is
or is not fractured." Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHio ST. L.J. 1, 4
(1960).
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other kinds of mental impairments. A criminal defendant who suffers
from mental disabilities such as mental retardation,4 mental disorders
caused by physical disease or trauma,' or "nervous breakdown" may
also be found mentally incompetent to proceed. Additionally, it is well
recognized that a defendant may be rendered mentally incompetent be-
cause of drug use or its discontinuance during the criminal proceeding.7
The law presumes that all persons are mentally competent.'
Therefore, competency hearings are not required as a matter of course,
and before a court will inquire into the issue, a "bona fide doubt" as
to the defendant's competency must be raised. In Pate v. Robinson,9
the United States Supreme Court held that a trial judge has a sua sponte
duty to suspend the proceedings and conduct a competency hearing if,
during the pendency of the action, facts are brought to his attention,
4. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717-19 (1972); United States v.
Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
5. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). It is also possible that a physical
disability by itself could result in physical incompetence to proceed. See Felts v.
Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129 (1906); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 454 (1967) [hereinafter cited as incompetency to Stand Trial]. Courts, however,
have ordinarily found the defendant's physical disability insufficiently severe to warrant a
continuance or postponement of the criminal proceeding. See, e.g., United States v.
Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Landsman, 366 F. Supp.
1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Albritton v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Miss. 1972);
Wojculewicz v. Cummings, 145 Conn. 11, 20-21, 138 A.2d 512, 516-18 (1958); Burt &
Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Ci. L. REv. 66,
85 n.78 (1972) [hereinafter cited as A Proposal].
6. See People v. Berling, 115 Cal. App. 2d 255, 251 P.2d 1017 (1953); People v.
Swallow, 60 Misc. 2d 171, 301 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1969).
7. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1963). See also United
States v. Williams, 468 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Fitzgerald v. La
Vallee, 461 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1972); Grennett v. United States, 403 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920, 921-24 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States
v. Morris, 406 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Il. 1975). On the other hand, many courts have held
that an otherwise incompetent defendant may go forward if he can be made competent
only by the use of drugs. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp.
987, 989, (D.V.I.), aff'd, 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975); People v. Dalfonso, 24 I11. App.
3d 748, 750-51, 321 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1974); State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 402-03,
218 So. 2d 311 (1969); People v. Parsons, 82 Misc. 2d 1090, 1092-93, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840,
842 (1975); State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 247-49, 204 S.E.2d 649, 655-56 (1974); State
v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 28-29, 426 P.2d 872, 875 (1967). Nevertheless, a defendant
may not be forced against his will to take drugs in order to attain competence. See State
v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 98-101, 492 P.2d 239, 241-42 (1971). See generally
Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental Compe-
tency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FORENSIC SCL 568 (1972).
8. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1369(f) (West Supp. 1976). See also Magenton
v. State, 76 S.D. 512, 518, 81 N.W.2d 894, 897 (1957); Weiland v. State, 58 Okla. Crim.
108, 112, 50 P.2d 741, 743 (1935).
9. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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either from his own observation or suggestion of counsel, which raise
a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's competency. 10 Furthermore,
a trial judge may not avoid his responsibility to make proper inquiry
regarding the defendant's mental competency by relying solely upon
a pretrial decision or pretrial psychiatric reports where, during the trial
or prior to sentencing, he is presented with a substantial change of cir-
cumstances or with new evidence which casts serious doubt upon the
validity of the pretrial finding of competency." A defendant who may
be incompetent cannot waive his right to an evidentiary hearing on the
question of his competency to stand trial.' 2
If a question concerning the defendant's mental competency
arises, the trial judge will appoint a psychiatrist or psychiatrists to ex-
amine the defendant.' 3 After the defendant has been examined, a
hearing will be held to determine if he is mentally competent.' 4 The
trial court may decide the question of mental competency; the defend-
ant does not have a federal constitutional right to have the question
decided by a jury.'5 It will be presumed that the defendant is mentally
10. Id. at 385. The Ninth Circuit has held that a competency hearing is
constitutionally required "at any time that there is 'substantial evidence' that the
defendant may be mentally incompetent." Evidence, the court explained, is "substantial"
if it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competency. Moore v. United States,
464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972). See also People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 426
P.2d 942, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967). The California Supreme Court has explained that
in determining the issue, the court must examine all the pertinent evidence. See People
v. Laudermilk, 67 Cal. 2d 272, 431 P.2d 228, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1967). Additionally,
Lauderinilk said that "more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions . . . or
bizarre statements . . . or statements of defense counsel that defendant is incapable of
cooperating in his defense . . . or psychiatric testimony that the defendant is immature,
dangerous, psychopathic, or homicidal or such diagnosis with little reference to defend-
ant's ability to assist in his own defense." Id. at 285, 431 P.2d at 237, 61 Cal. Rptr. at
653 (citations omitted). See also de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975 (9th Cir.
1976); People v. Hays, 54 Cal. App. 3d 755, 126 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1976).
11. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975); cf. People v. Melissakis, 56
Cal. App. 3d 52, 62, 128 Cal. Rptr. 122, 127-28 (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4244
(1970); United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Evans v. LaVallee, 446 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
12. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); Tillery v. Eyman, 492 F.2d
1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1974). But see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176 (1975)
(holding that Pate merely cast doubt on the validity of such a waiver).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970). Under California law, the court may appoint a
licensed psychologist. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1369(a) (West Supp. 1976).
14. Id.
15. See United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249, 267 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1016 (1972); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 970 (1969); United States v. Huff, 409 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966); State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, .57 Wis.
2d 315, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973). In California, a defendant may request that his
competent until it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is mentally incompetent. 16
A defendant may seek to raise the issue of his mental competency
in postconviction proceedings. In Drope v. Missouri,17 the court recog-
nized that there are many difficulties inherent in a retrospective deter-
mination of mental competency. These difficulties are not, however,
unmanageable. The question to be determined in each case is whether
the circumstances surrounding the case permit a fair retrospective de-
termination of the defendant's competency at the time of trial.'"
At one time, the defendant found mentally incompetent was com-
mitted to a mental hospital or treatment facility until it was determined
that he had attained the capacity to proceed. If he never attained the
requisite capacity, his commitment operated as a life sentence.' 9 In
1972, the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana,- put an end to this
scheme for the commitment of incompetent criminal defendants. In
a unanimous opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court held that the
indefinite commitment of a mentally incompetent defendant offended
constitutional principles of equal protection and due process.2 The
Court said in Jackson that a criminal defendant who is committed be-
cause of his incompetency to proceed to trial cannot be held more than
the period needed to determine whether there is "a substantial prob-
ability that he will attain the capacity in the foreseeable future.
'"2 2  If
it is determined that there is a probability the defendant will soon be
able to proceed, his continued commitment must be justified by prog-
ress toward that goal. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the
defendant cannot be expected to become sufficiently competent to pro-
competency be determined by a jury. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1369 (West Supp. 1976);
People v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 459, 124 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1975).
16. See United States v. Marbley, 410 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1969); Grennett v.
United States, 403 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Bornholdt v.
Ternillo, 402 F. Supp. 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also CAL PEN. CODE § 1369(f)
(West Supp. 1976); People v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 459, 124 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1975).
17. 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975); see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966).
18. de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 986 n.11 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
Nathaniel v. Estelle, 493 F.2d 794, 798 (5-th Cir. 1974).
19. See Parker, California's New Scheme for the Commitment of Individuals
Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 6 PAC. L.J. 484, 485 (1975); Incompetency to Stand
Trial, supra note 5.
20. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
21. Id. at 723-39. See also In re Davis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 178 (1973).
22. 406 US. at 738.
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ceed, civil commitment proceedings must be instituted or the defendant
will be released.
23
Jackson did set the stage for further reform of the law governing
mental competency. The Supreme Court noted that the Model Penal
Code would permit the attorney for a mentally incompetent defendant
to contest any issue "susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and
without the personal participation of the defendant."24 The Court said
its previous decisions should not be read to preclude the states from
allowing an incompetent defendant to raise certain defenses such as in-
sufficiency of the indictment or to make pretrial motions through coun-
sel.2 5 Jackson also referred approvingly to the procedures in some jur-
isdictions which allow the incompetent defendant a trial at which he
may establish his innocence without permitting a conviction.2 6 And in
Drope v. Missouri,27 the Court indicated that in certain cases it might
be constitutionally permissible to defer a defendant's competency hear-
ing until the criminal proceeding has been completed. Drope said that
such a procedure may have advantages where the defendant is present
at trial and "the appropriate inquiry is made with dispatch. '28  Such
a procedure would void a conviction where the defendant is later found
incompetent.
29
The standard for determining whether a defendant is mentally
competent is the cutting edge of the law. Application of this standard
separates the mentally competent defendant from the defendant who
is mentally incompetent. The first section of this article focuses upon
the general standard of mental competency enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Dusky v. United States."0 The second section examines the
23. Id. See also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst'n, 407 U.S. 245 (1972)
(indefinite commitment "for observation" of convicted felon held invalid). It has been
suggested that the law should go even further to permit the defendant to force the
prosecution to go forward even if the defendant is incompetent. See A Proposal, supra
note 5. Comment, An End to Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 SANTA CLMAR LAw. 560
(1973). See also People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 111. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970).
It is argued that even the incompetent defendant should have the opportunity to litigate
the issue of his guilt and that special procedural rules could be used to compensate for
his incapacities. See A Proposal, supra note 5, at 75-76. Nevertheless, there is some
doubt that even these safeguards would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process if the defendant is without some ability to relate to the proceedings.
24. 406 U.S. at 740-41.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 420 U.S. 162, 182 (1975).
28. Id.
29. Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
30. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
standard under Westbrook v. Arizona31 for mental competency appli-
cable to the criminal defendant who waives counsel and chooses to re-
present himself. Finally, the third section deals with the standard of
mental competency applicable if the defendant pleads guilty.
Competency Standard
General Test of Mental Competency
In Dusky v. United States,3 2 the defendant was charged by indict-
ment in federal court with transporting in interstate commerce a girl
who had been kidnapped.33 At arraignment, the court granted the de-
fense motion that Dusky be examined at the federal medical center in
Springfield, Missouri, to determine his competency to stand trial. Fol-
lowing the examination, a psychiatric report was filed with the court
and a hearing was held to determine Dusky's competency to stand
trial.34 At this hearing, the chief of the psychiatric service at the medi-
cal center testified that Dusky could not, because of delusions and dis-
torted thinking, testify in a factual manner or interpret facts so that he
was able to "add two and two, figuratively speaking, and come up with
a proper conclusion.""
Despite this evidence, the district court concluded that Dusky was
mentally competent to stand trial. The trial judge said that he was of
the opinion that the evidence showed Dusky was oriented as to time
and place and person, understood the nature of the charge pending
against him, and was able to recite facts so that his attorney could de-
velop them in preparing the defense. 36  Dusky was found guilty, and
his conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court held that the record
did not provide sufficient evidence from which a finding of competence
31. 384 U.S. 150, 150-51 (1966).
32. 362 U.S. at 402.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V, 1975).
34. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S.
402 (1960).
35. See A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 104 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as MATTHEWS]. This work reprints a transcript of the competency
hearing in the Dusky case, as does Haddox, Gross & Pollack, Mental Competency to
Stand Trial While Under the Influence of Drugs, 7 LOYOLA L. REV. (Los ANGELES) 425
(1974).
36. 271 F.2d at 389-90.
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could be made.17  The conviction was therefore reversed and re-
manded to the district court for a new hearing. In remanding the
Court stated that the
test [for competency] must be whether [the defendant] has suffi-
cient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.38
The Dusky test was derived from the common law "understand and
assist" standard of mental competency. This test had been used in the
federal courts as early as 1899, when the Sixth Circuit in Youtsey v.
United States3" reversed the conviction of a defendant because the trial
court had failed to make inquiry into whether epileptic seizures had
rendered him "incapable of understanding the proceedings, and intelli-
gently advising with his counsel as to his defense ... . In 1906,
a federal district court in United States v. Chisolm41 held that a defend-
ant may stand trial in a criminal case "if he rightly comprehends his
own condition with reference to the proceedings" and is able to "testify
intelligently and give his counsel all the material facts" in the case.
42
The Dusky standard was thus established as the minimum test for
federal cases.43 Several federal courts, however, have held that Dusky
also establishes the minimum standard under the Constitution and
therefore is applicable in reviewing state convictions in federal habeas
corpus proceedings.44 In any event, most states have adopted equiva-
lent tests either by statute or case law."
Application of Dusky
Two fundamental points must be understood in applying the test
of mental competency set out in Dusky and its predecessors. First, the
Dusky test must be distinguished from the rules used to determine
criminal responsibility, the best known of which are the tests stated in
37. 362 U.S. at 402.
38. Id.
39. 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
40. Id. at 946.
41. 149 F. 284 (S.D. Ala. 1906).
42. Id. at 287.
43. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). Drope, however, does not
explain by what authority this test has been made the rule for federal cases.
44. See United States ex rel. Curtis v. Zelker, 466 F.2d 1092, 1095 n.5 (2d Cir.
1972); Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673, 676-77 (8th Cir. 1965). See also Mackey v.
Craven, 537 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1976); Note, Competence to Plead Guilty: A New
Standard, 1974 DUKE L.J. 149, 153 n.18 [hereinafter cited as A New Standard].
45. See A New Standard, supra note 44, at 153-54.
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M'Naghten's Case46 and the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code.4" These rules were not devised to test a defendant's compe-
tency to go forward in a criminal proceeding but, rather, to determine
whether the defendant, at the time of the offense, had the mental capac-
ity to be responsible for his criminal act. The inapplicability of
M'Naghten and the Model Penal Code tests to the issue of present
mental competency is almost too obvious to state, yet in Bruce v. Es-
telle,48 the Fifth Circuit was compelled in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding to remand a case for a new competency determination where
the test of mental competency used by the state trial court was whether
the defendant during trial knew the difference between "right and
wrong" under M'Naghten.
Second, the narrow purpose of the Dusky test is to determine the
effect, if any, that a defendant's mental impairment can be expected
to have on his ability to function adequately during trial. The problem
addressed by Dusky is not resolved by a determination of whether the
defendant is "mentally ill." A finding of mental impairment is not
necessarily a determination that the defendant is unable "to consult
with h1s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."
Nor does such a determination compel the conclusion that the defend-
ant will be incapable of a "rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him."49
Understanding the Proceeding
To be competent to go forward in a criminal prosecution, the de-
fendant must be able to follow the proceedings, evaluate the evidence,
and understand the significance of what is transpiring in the courtroom.
Describing the degree of understanding that a defendant must have,
the Court in Dusky said that it is not enough that the defendant be
oriented in time and place. Rather, the defendant must have a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.5" In
46. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
47. MODEL PEN. CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
48. 483 F.2d 1031, 1041-43 (5th Cir. 1973).
49. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); see United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284
(S.D. Ala. 1906); People v. Laudermilk, 67 Cal. 2d 272, 285, 431 P.2d 228, 237, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 644, 653 (1967); State ex rel. Haskins v. County Ct. 62 Wis. 2d 250, 265-66, 214
N.W.2d 575, 583 (1974). See generally MATrHEWS, supra note 35, at 86; Haddox,
Gross & Pollack, Mental Competency to Stand Trial While Under the Influence of
Drugs, 7 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los ANGELES) 425, (1974); Slough & Wilson, Mental
Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. PiTr. L. REv. 593, 595 (1960); Incompetency to Stand
Trial, supra note 5, at 460.
50. 362 U.S. at 402.
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People v. Swallow, a New York trial court explained that "[t]he word
understanding requires some depth of understanding, not merely sur-
face knowledge of the proceedings." 51
In addition to the ability to understand what is taking place in the
courtroom, the defendant must also be able to understand the nature
of the proceedings against him. The defendant going to trial must be
able to understand the charge brought against him, that he will be
in a court of law where the truth of that charge will be determined,
that there will be a judge in charge of the proceedings, a prosecuting
attorney and a defense counsel to present evidence and argue the case,
and a jury, if the defendant desires one, to determine questions of fact.
Finally, the defendant must understand that if he is found guilty of the
crime with which he is charged, he will be subject to punishment.
5 2
A defendant whose mental ability is so impaired by a mental dis-
order that he is not able to understand what is occurring at trial would
necessarily be suffering from the most severe kind of mental disorder
or impairment. Jackson v. Indiana5" presents such a case. There the
defendant, a mentally defective deaf mute with the mental ability of
a preschool child, was found incompetent to stand trial for two robber-
ies involving four dollars on one occasion and five dollars on another.
One psychiatrist testified that the defendant's mental defect was so
severe that there was little chance that he could learn sign language
so that he could participate in his trial. Another psychiatrist testified
that even if the defendant were able to develop such skills, he would
still be unable to comprehend the proceedings.54 Similarly, in People
v. Berling,"5 the California Court of Appeal reversed a first degree
51. 60 Misc. 2d 171, 175, 301 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (1969).
52. See the testimony for the competency hearing in Dusky, reprinted in
MATTHEWS, supra note 35. In a more recent case, a physician at the facility where
Dusky was examined testified as to the criteria used to determine a defendant's under-
standing of the proceeding. The physician said, "First, we try to assess whether he has
awareness of the charges pending against him. . . whether he knows that he will be in a
courtroom and the type of courtroom, that is, is it a federal, state or county, civil, so
forth, criminal. . . . Then we try to assess whether he knows who will be in the court-
room, the principals of the court and their various functions, including the judge, prose-
cuting attorney, defense counsel, members of a jury. . . and so forth. We try to assess
whether he has a knowledge of the types of punishments that could be levied by the court
• ..also whether he has a knowledge of what pleas may be entered before the court and
the implications of various pleas and whether he is educable to these facts. . . ." United
States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 388 F. Supp. 221, 227 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
53. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
54. Id. at 725. See also People v. Lang, 26 I1. App. 648, 325 N.E.2d 305 (1975),
appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 851 (1976).
55. 115 Cal. App. 2d 255, 251 P.2d 1017 (1953).
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murder conviction where the defendant throughout the trial suffered
fainting spells and dizziness caused by emotional strain. The record
showed that the defendant fainted numerous times during the trial and
collapsed into unconsciousness several times while on the witness stand.
Although the trial court did not stop the proceedings, at one point the
court said to the defendant, "When your voice drops as it does and
your eyes partially close and open slowly, the appearance is that you
are not in a condition to observe what is going on."56
A final example is Hansford v. United States,5 a case from the
District of Columbia Circuit involving the trial of a narcotics addict.
There it was shown that the defendant used narcotics during most of
the trial and was abruptly forced to discontinue their use near the end
of trial. The majority opinion by Judge Bazelon held that the district
court had the duty to hold a competency hearing to determine whether
"an acute brain syndrome" from the use of narcotics and possible with-
drawal reactions from their discontinuance affected the defendant's
competency under the Dusky test.58 On the effect of drug withdrawal
symptoms, the court said a defendant may be incapable of following
the evidence and so preoccupied with his real or imagined suffering
that he loses all interest in his case and desires that it end as quickly
as possible. 9
Assisting in the Defense
Ability to Communicate. For a defendant to assist adequately in
his defense, he must have sufficient communicative skill to confer in-
telligently with his attorney and testify coherently on his own behalf.6
Jackson v. Indiana6' presents the clear case of a defendant who lacked
sufficient communicative ability to assist adequately in his defense.
62
Memory. The courts have taken a strict view where the defend-
ant has asserted that he has suffered loss of memory caused by a mental
56. Id. at 269, 251 P.2d at 1024.
57. 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
58. Id. at 922-23.
59. Id. at 924.
60. See United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (S.D. Ala. 1906); United States
v. Horwitz, 360 F. Supp. 772, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Sermon, 228 F.
Supp. 972, 977 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 5, at 457
(1967); Note, Illinois Fitness for Trial, 6 LOYOLA U.L. REV. (CHICAGO) 678, 684-85
(1975).
61. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
62. See also People v. Lang, 26 Ill. App. 2d 648, 325 N.E.2d 305 (1975), appeal
dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 851 (1976).
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disorder which prevents him from remembering the events of the
alleged crime. In United States v. Sermon,68 a panel of psychiatrists
who had evaluated the defendant were in unanimous agreement that
because of a "chronic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arterioscle-
rosis" the defendant suffered memory loss and was not able adequately
to assist his counsel.64  Nevertheless, the court held that he was com-
petent to go to trial since he was sufficiently alert to advise his counsel
whether the "broad outline of the evidence" to be presented by the
government was or was not fabricated.65
Similar results have been reached by the courts in cases where the
defendant claims to be suffering from amnesia.66 The courts have re-
jected the argument that a defendant's alleged loss of memory is suffi-
cient to render him incapable of standing trial. Some decisions have ex-
pressed the fear that if memory loss alone were enough for a finding
of incompetency, fraudulent allegations of memory loss could easily be
made in order to avoid a criminal prosecution. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has noted that cases abound where the defendant claims,
"I don't remember anything, .... My mind went blank," "I blacked out,"
or "I panicked and don't remember what I did or anything that hap-
pened. '68  In addition, it has been observed that there is little differ-
ence between a claim of amnesia and the disadvantages suffered by
many defendants whose memories fade or to whom important facts are
unavailable for other reasons such as the death of a material witness.6 9
One court has pointed out that barring the prosecution of an amnesiac
would effectively free him since there would be no basis for committing
to a mental institution a person whose only impairment was loss of
memory."0
Though the courts have generally shown little sympathy for the
defendant claiming loss of memory, the District of Columbia Circuit
63. 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
64. Id. at 977.
65. Id. at 980.
66. Amnesia is simply a failure of memory concerning facts or events to which a
person has been exposed. There are two broadly recognized causes of amnesia-psychic
trauma and physical trauma. See Comment, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of
Particular Justice, 71 YALE L.J. 109 (1961); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 544, 550 (1972).
67. See Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 802 (Alaska Sup. Ct.) (1974); United
States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1972).
68. See Commonwealth v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 401, 218 A.2d 758, 760 (1966). See
also United States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1071 (D. Del. 1972).
69. See United States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1071 (D.
Del. 1972); Reagon v. State, 253 Ind. 143, 147, 251 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1969).
70. See People v. Soto, 68 Misc. 2d 629, 632-33, 327 N.Y.S.2d 669, 672-73
(1972).
held that in an established case of amnesia, due process may require
posttrial findings to insure that the defendant was afforded a fair trial.
In the leading case of United States v. Wilson,71 the government con-
ceded that the defendant suffered from permanent retrograde amnesia
following a head injury sustained in a high speed chase after a robbery.
Judge J. Skelly Wright, speaking for the majority, ruled that the district
court, in making its posttrial findings, should consider: (1) the extent
to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to consult with
and assist his lawyer; (2) the extent to which the amnesia affected the
defendant's ability to testify in his own behalf; (3) the extent to which
the evidence could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the am-
nesia; (4) the extent to which the government assisted the defendant
and his counsel in that reconstruction; (5) the strength of the prosecu-
tion's case; and (6) any other facts and circumstances to indicate
whether or not the defendant had a fair trial.7 2
Reasoning ability. In Dusky, the trial judge erroneously believed
that a defendant needed only to be able to identify facts and that he
was competent to stand trial even if he had no ability to make a rational
interpretation of the facts. Thus, if the defendant could recognize "2"
as "2" the court felt it was not necessary that he be able to add "2
+ 2" and arrive at a total of "4." Dusky states that the defendant must
have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reason-
able degree of rational understanding."73  It is apparent that to assist
properly in his defense, the defendant must have some capacity to rea-
son from a simple premise to a simple conclusion.
7
1
A defendant in a criminal proceeding must also have the corre-
sponding ability to make decisions during the course of the proceeding
in response to alternatives explained to him by his attorney.7 5 At trial,
71. 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
72. Id. at 463-64. In Drope, Chief Justice Burger said a posttrial determination
of competency "may have advantages, at least where the defendant is present at the trial
and the appropriate inquiry is implemented with dispatch." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 180 (1975). See also Hansford v. United States, 384 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Leventhal, J., concur-
ring).
73. Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
74. See Haddox, Gross & Pollack, Mental Competency to Stand Trial While Under
the Influence of Drugs, 7 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los ANGELES) 425, 435-36 (1974).
75. See People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 334, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976); People ex
rel. Bernstein v. McNeill, 48 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (Sup. Ct. 1944); H. SILVING, ESSAYS IN
MENTAL CAPACITY AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT 165 (1967); Robey, Criteria for Competency
to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616, 619 (1965);
A New Standard, supra note 44, at 169; Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 5, at
458.
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the defendant must be able to decide with the advice of counsel what
defenses to raise and whether to testify and thus waive his fifth amend-
ment right. He must also be capable of exercising some degree of
supervision over the strategy decisions of his attorney and be able to
consider dismissing counsel who conducts the defense inadequately.76
In this process it is not enough that the defendant be capable of giving
only "passive assistance" in the conduct of the defense. It is the de-
fendant who is on trial, and it is he who will personally suffer the con-
sequences if the defense fails.
Mental Competency To Waive Counsel
and Conduct a Defense
In State v. Westbrook,7  an Arizona case, the defendant was
charged with murder. Prior to trial, three psychiatrists were appointed
by the trial court to examine him. At the conclusion of their examina-
tion it was their unanimous opinion that he understood the nature of
the charges against him and could assist in his own defense. Subse-
quently, the trial court made a determination that the defendant was
able to understand the nature of the charges against him and could as-
sist in his own defense, and "that he was neither mentally defective
nor insane and could proceed to trial. '7 8 Defendant, insisting upon rep-
resenting himself, was tried by a jury and convicted of first degree
murder with the penalty set at death.
On appeal, he argued that he was mentally incompetent to repre-
sent himself at trial.7 9  In response, the Arizona Supreme Court held
that the trial court was not required "to set a hearing to determine
whether the defendant through insanity or mental deficiency was not
able to conduct his own defense."8  Defendant then petitioned to the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court
granted his petition and held in a very brief per curiam opinion:
Although petitioner received a hearing on the issue of his compe-
tence to stand trial, there appears to have been no hearing or in-
76. See A New Standard, supra note 44, at 169; Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra
note 5, at 458. See also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 388 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 334, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976).
77. 99 Ariz. 30, 406 P.2d 388 (1965), vacated & remanded, 384 U.S. 150
(1966).
78. Id. at 34, 406 P.2d at 390.
79. Ironically, Westbrook was charged with killing an attorney. They had been
arguing over the adequacy of the representation provided by the victim's law firm in a
civil case in which Westbrook was involved. See id.
80. Id. at 34, 406 P.2d at 391.
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quiry into the issue of his competence to waive his constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel and proceed, as he did, to conduct
his own defense. "The constitutional right of an accused to be
represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial
court, in which the accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is
without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and
weighty rcsponsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether
there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused."
From an independent examination of the record, we conclude
that the question whether this 'protecting duty' was fulfilled should
be re-examined in light of our decision this Term in Pate v. Robin-
son. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona
is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings
not inconsistent herewith.
8 1
In Westbrook v. Arizona, the Court recognized for the first time
a distinction between a defendant's competency to stand trial and his
competency to waive counsel and represent himself.8 2  Hence, if a de-
fendant desires to proceed pro se, the trial court must first determine
whether he is competent to stand trial. If he is, the trial court must
then determine whether he is competent to waive counsel and repre-
sent himself.83
81. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (citations omitted). For the
proposition that the trial judge must determine whether the accused was competent to
waive his right to counsel, the Court cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938):
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). In Pate v. Robinson, Justice Clark stated
that the per curiam reversal in Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956), meant that
"the conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process
and that state procedures must be adequate to protect this right." Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375, 378 (1966). Justice Harlan, in dissent, thought that "'the constitutional viola-
tion alleged [was] the failure to make an inquiiy." Id. at 388 n.l.
82. See United States ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750, 754 (2d Cir.
1975); Government of Virgin Islands v. Niles, 295 F. Supp. 266 (D.V.I. 1969); State v.
Kolocotronis, 73 Wash. 2d 92, 436 P.2d 774 (1968).
In Kolocotronis, the Washington Supreme Court s:ated: "[Westbrook v. Arizona]
holds unequivocally, that an adjudication by the trial court that an accused is capable of
going to trial and aiding his counsel, is not a determination of his competency to act as
his own counsel.
"When the accused demands his constitutional right to act as his own counsel, the
trial court is faced with the necessity of making a factual determination of the
competency of the accused to: (1) intelligently waive the services of counsel, and (2)
act as his own counsel." 73 Wash. 2d at 101, 436 P.2d at 781 (1968).
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Niles, the court conducted a hearing to
determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. During the course of the hearing,
defendant expressed the desire to defend himself if the court found him competent under
the Dusky test but incompetent under the Westbrook test. The court held, "As for
defendant's competency to waive counsel, the court is of the opinion that one who may
be suffering from paranoid delusions should not be entrusted with the sole conduct of his
defense." 295 F. Supp. at 266.
83. A defendant who is mentally incompetent to stand trial is also mentally
incompetent to represent himself. On the other hand, the defendant found mentally
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Westbrook was an affirmation of the principle that the United
States Supreme Court had earlier stated in Massey v. Moore.8 4 The
Court in Massey said that a defendant "might not be insane in the sense
of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand
trial without the benefit of counsel.""5  The case was remanded to the
district court for a hearing to determine the petitioner's ability to repre-
sent himself without counsel."0
The Westbrook principle that there should be a higher level of men-
tal competency required before a defendant can defend himself implies
the kind of standard to be applied in self-representation cases. A
defendant must be free of mental disorder which would so impair his
free will that his decision to waive counsel would not be voluntary.
Furthermore, for his waiver of counsel to be intelligent, he must have
the mental capacity to understand that the unskilled defendant is nor-
mally at a disadvantage if he proceeds without counsel. 87  However,
there is nothing that is conceptually more difficult to comprehend than
that which every defendant must be able to understand in order to be
found competent to stand trial. Moreover, the defendant will be aided
by the trial judge who has a sua sponte duty to explain fully the sig-
competent to stand trial may be found mentally incompetent to waive counsel and
represent himself. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Niles, 295 F. Supp. 266 (D.V.I.
1969); cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974).
84. 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
85. Id. at 108.
86. It might be well to describe the context in which the statement in Massey v.
Moore was made. Massey was decided on the law as it stood prior to Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Before Gideon, an indigent was entitled to appointed
counsel only in cases where some particular factor limiting the effectiveness of an
unrepresented defendant or otherwise calling for the appointment of counsel (e.g., capital
cases) was present. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). This was the "spe-
cial circumstances" rule of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Massey, the defend-
ant, on trial for robbery, was too poor to hire a lawyer. He was convicted without
assistance of counsel in spite of signs of insanity and mental incompetency. 348
U.S. 105, 106 .(1954). He later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal
court, where a district court judge refused to find him incompetent. The court of appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded for appropriate findings
on the ground that while the defendant may have been competent to stand trial, it was
not clear whether he was competent to stand trial without the assistance of counsel.
Thus, although Massey and Westbrook evolved from entirely different contexts,
both stand for the proposition that the conviction of a defendant without the assistance
of counsel cannot stand unless the defendant meets a test of mental competency which is
higher than the test of mental competency to stand trial.
87. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Hodge v. United States,
414 F.2d 1040, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent,
388 F. Supp. 221, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975); People v.
Holcomb, 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343 (1975).
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nificance and consequences of the decision to waive counsel. The court
may also designate counsel to aid the defendant in making this decision,
as the defendant is entitled to counsel until his waiver is accepted by
the court.
The higher standard of competency in Westbrook applies not be-
cause of the defendant's decision to waive counsel, but because the
waiver of counsel necessarily embraces an assessment of the defend-
ant's mental competency to conduct his own defense. 88 The defendant
who waives counsel will be alone when it becomes necessary to decide
whether to testify or to decide matters involving trial procedure and
strategy. He must therefore be able to determine the alternatives
available to him during the proceeding, to evaluate these choices, and
to decide for himself what action to take. He will not have guidance
from an attorney and cannot depend upon the court to provide the
assistance he would receive if he had counsel. In this situation, it is
clear that the defendant must have greater powers of comprehension,
judgment, and reason than would be necessary to stand trial with the aid
of an attorney. Thus, the higher standard of Westbrook necessarily
involves an assessment of the defendant's ability to conduct his own
defense. The inquiry required by Westbrook must focus on the differ-
ences in the roles played by represented and unrepresented defendants.
In United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent,8" the higher test
of competency to waive counsel and conduct a defense was applied in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Konigsberg was found competent
to stand trial in a New York court on the charges of extortion and con-
spiracy to extort. After twelve days of trial and damaging testimony
from a codefendant who had turned state's evidence, Konigsberg de-
cided to dismiss counsel and represent himself; the court accepted
his decision but directed Konigsberg's attorney to continue to sit at the
counsel table and assist him. Following his conviction and sentence
to state prison, Konigsberg claimed in a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, filed in the federal court, that although he was found competent
to stand trial, he did not have the capacity to proceed without the bene-
fit of counsel. 90
The state trial record did not conclusively indicate whether the
trial judge made inquiry into Konigsberg's mental competency to repre-
88. See People v. Powers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 904, 915, 64 Cal. Rptr. 450, 458
(1967). See A New Standard, supra note 44, at 166-67; cf. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S.
105, 108 (1954); State v. Kolocotronis, 73 Wash. 2d 92, 102, 436 P.2d 774, 781 (1968).
89. 388 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. 526 F.2d at 133.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
March 1977] MENTAL COMPETENCY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1069
sent himself under Westbrook. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was
held in the district court to determine if the state trial judge made a
sufficient inquiry into Konigsberg's mental competency to waive
counsel."' It was determined at that hearing that the state trial judge
had never specifically made inquiry into Konigsberg's mental com-
petency to represent himself and in fact framed the issue in terms of
assisting counsel. 2  Nevertheless, the state trial judge testified in the
federal hearing that he was able to determine from the state proceed-
ings that Konigsberg "knew the procedure . . . and [was] fully com-
petent and capable of handling himself." He further testified that im-
plicit in his finding was a determination that Konigsberg was competent
to know that he was depriving himself of the services of a lawyer and
that he was "deliberately assuming the risks of representing himself." 93
On appeal from the denial of the writ, the judgment was affirmed by
the Second Circuit with the observation that the district court correctly
recognized that the standard of competency for making the decision to
represent oneself was "vaguely higher than the standard for compet-
ence to stand trial. 0 4
Other courts, however, have refused to acknowledge the distinc-
tion between mental competency to stand trial and mental competency
to waive counsel and conduct a criminal defense. In People v. Rea-
son, 5 the New York Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, held
that the trial court was not required to make a finding as to the defend-
ant's mental competency to waive counsel and proceed pro se. The
court said a finding that Reason was mentally competent to stand trial
together with a record showing the defendant's awareness of the risks
and consequences of self-representation was sufficient to show that the
trial court properly allowed the defendant to waive counsel and conduct
his own defense. 96 Westbrook was distinguished on the ground that
it was concerned with the intelligence of the waiver and the court
91. United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 388 F. Supp. 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), afj'd, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. 388 F. Supp. at 226-27.
93. Id. at 227. In her concurring opinion in United States v. Odom, Judge
Hufstedler also indicated that a reviewing court may determine from the record that the
higher standard of competency was met even if the trial court erroneously applied the
general test of competency in Dusky. United States v. Odom, 423 F.2d 875, 877 (9th
Cir. 1970) (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
94. United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1975);
see United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1123 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
95. 37 N.Y.2d 351, 334 N.E.2d 572 (1975).
96. Id at 356, 334 N.E.2d at 575.
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stated that a higher standard of competence to waive counsel would in-
fringe upon the defendant's right to appear and defend in person.1
7
Similarly, in United States v. Odom,98 the Ninth Circuit held that
after a finding by the trial court that the defendant is mentally com-
petent to stand trial, the court may grant the defendant's motion to rep-
resent himself without making a determination that he is mentally
competent to waive counsel and conduct a defense. The court rea-
soned that if the self-representation motion had been denied it would
have placed the trial court in "the anomalous position of finding a de-
fendant incompetent for asserting a constitutional right."9
It should be clear that Reason and Odom are incorrect in failing
to recognize the higher level of mental competency required for a de-
fendant to waive counsel and conduct his defense. Even if Reason
were correct in its interpretation of Westbrook, there can be no mis-
taking what the court meant in Massey when it said that a defendant
might be "incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand
trial without benefit of counsel." 10 But apart from their clear conflict
with Westbrook and Massey, both cases were decided on the basis of
the mistaken view that a higher level of competence for a defendant
to waive counsel and proceed pro se would infringe upon the defend-
ant's right of self-representation, a right conclusively established in
Faretta v. California.'
In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has
a constitutional right to self-representation. Though the court acknowl-
edged that in most criminal prosecutions the accused could better de-
fend with counsel's guidance than by his own unskilled efforts, the
court said, "Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. "102
The Court in Faretta stated that although the defendant who proceeds
pro se may conduct his own defense ultimately to his detriment, his
choice must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which
is the lifeblood of the law."'0 3
A higher competency standard for defendants seeking to repre-
sent themselves is not inconsistent with the Faretta decision. The
Court in Faretta was concerned with whether the constitutional right
97. Id. at 355, 334 N.E.2d at 574-75.
98. 423 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1970).
99. Id. at 877.
100. 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
101. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
102. Id. at 834.
103. Id., quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of self-representation existed and it did not provide a detailed treatment
of the circumstances under which a request for self-representation must
be granted. It was made clear, however, that the accused's legal skills
are not relevant in this determination. 04  The higher standard enun-
ciated in Westbrook is not concerned with the lack of legal skills per
se. Westbrook contemplates a defendant who suffers from some type
of mental impairment which, while not interfering with his ability to
assist counsel or understand the proceedings, does restrict his ability
to defend himself. Westbrook recognized that "mental competency"
may mean different things in different contexts; nothing in Faretta con-
tradicts this concept. The Court in determining that Faretta should
have been allowed to represent himself, noted in passing that he was
"competent."' 8 Although this casual reference probably has no bearing
on whether a pro se defendant must meet a higher standard of mental
competency, it does show that an incompetent defendant does not have
the right to self-representation. 10 6
Thus, where the defendant is found mentally competent to pro-
ceed under Dusky but not competent under Westbrook to waive counsel
and conduct his own defense, the defendant would still go forward
in the proceedings with counsel. 0 7  Though the defendant would have
preferred self-representation, the trial court should explain its decision
and urge the defendant to cooperate with counsel in order to assure
the most effective defense.
A problem can arise if the defendant who is unwilling to accept
the court's determination refuses to cooperate with his attorney. This
situation, however, is closely analogous to the case in which the defend-
ant chooses not to participate in his defense by voluntarily absenting
himself from the courtroom. In such a case, the courts have treated
the absence as a waiver by the defendant of his right to be present
during the proceedings against him.'0 8 Similarly, a refusal by a de-
104. 422 U.S. at 836.
105. Id. at 835.
106. In Faretta, the issue of whether a higher standard is required was not raised
since there was no evidence raising a doubt as to the defendant's mental competency.
107. See People v. Tracy, 12 Cal. App. 3d 94, 103, 90 Cal. Rptr. 375, 3901 (1970).
See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975); People v. Powers,
256 Cal. App. 2d 904, 915, 64 Cal. Rptr. 450, 458 (1967); State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d 301
(La. Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 218 (1975); People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351, 334
N.E.2d 572 (1975) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
108. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); People v. White, 18 Cal. App.
3d 44, 95 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1971). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 182 (1975);
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); People v. Guillory, 178 Cal. App. 2d 854, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 415 (1960); People v. Rogers, 150 Cal. App. 2d 403, 309 P.2d 949 (1957).
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fendant to cooperate with his attorney should be viewed as a relinquish-
ment of the right to assist in his defense, and the proceeding should
continue. So long as a defendant is mentally able to assist in his de-
fense, the criminal proceeding should not be prevented from going for-
ward because the defendant voluntarily chooses not to do so.
Competency To Plead Guilty
It has generally been held that the test for mental competency to
stand trial and plead guilty is the same. 1"9 In People v. Heral,n0 for
example, the Illinois Supreme Court held:
[A] finding of competency to stand trial necessarily involves a
finding that, with the advice and assistance of counsel, defendant
is capable of waiving some or all of his constitutional rights, wheth-
er by a plea of guilty or during the course of his trial. 11
In Sieling v. Eyman, 1 2 the Ninth Circuit held that a higher level
of competency is required to enter a plea of guilty."' In Sieling, the
defendant, who was represented by counsel, was found competent
under the Dusky test. Prior to trial, he entered a plea of guilty to
three counts of an eight count indictment pursuant to a negotiated plea.
Following his conviction and sentence to state prison, he filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court attacking the
validity of his guilty plea. His petition was dismissed by the district
court and he appealed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, relying on West-
brook v. Arizona,1 ' held that a higher level of competency is required
before a defendant can plead guilty. The court, reading Westbrook as
a case concerned only with the validity of a waiver of counsel rather than
competency to conduct a defense, compared the constitutional right
to counsel with the constitutional right to remain silent, the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury, and the constitutional right to confront
109. See United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 342 n.2 (3d Cir.
1975); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 1973); Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 444
(10th Cir. 1970); Grennett v. United States, 403 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Baker
v. United States, 334 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1964); Clayton v. United States, 302 F.2d
30, 35 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634, 635 (2d Cir. 1960);
State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 542 P.2d 17 (1975); People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329.
342 N.E.2d 34 (1976); Commonwealth v. Miller, 454 Pa. 67, 309 A.2d 705 (1973).
110. 62 111. 2d 329, 342 N.E.2d 34 (1976).
111. Id. at 335, 342 N.E.2d at 37. See also Commonwealth v. Leate, 327 N.E.2d
866 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1975).
112. 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
113. Id. at 214-15.
114. 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
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one's accusers, and concluded that for a defendant to waive a funda-
mental constitutional right, a higher level of competency is required.""
Sieling is open to serious question. A defendant must have the
same ability to understand and reason whether he is pleading guilty or
standing trial. Although a defendant in pleading guilty necessarily
waives the right to remain silent, the right to a trial by jury, and the
right to confront his accusers, 1 6 this does not, in and of itself, require
a higher level of mental competency. As noted in People v. Heral,".
7
a defendant who stands trial will be called upon to make similar
waivers. At some point, the defendant who stands trial must decide
whether he should testify in his own behalf. In making this decision,
the defendant must, after considering the explanation and advice of his
lawyer, weigh the advantages of the privilege against self-incrimination
against the advantage of personally putting forward his version of the
facts and his credibility as a witness."" The defendant may also be
called upon to decide whether to waive a jury trial and be tried by the
court. And finally the defendant may have to decide which of the pros-
ecution's witnesses will or will not be cross-examined."19
Furthermore, Sieling's reliance on Westbrook is misplaced. The
higher standard of competency required by Westbrook comes into play
only because the defendant seeks to waive counsel and represent him-
self. In Westbrook, the Court said that an additional inquiry was
required because the defendant waived his right to counsel "and pro-
ceed[ed], as he did, to conduct his own defense."' 0 The higher stand-
ard of mental competency is not required not because of the waiver
decision itself but because the trial court's acceptance of the defendant's
115. 478 F.2d at 214-15. The court held, "A defendant is not competent to plead
guilty if a mental illness has substantially impaired his ability to make a reasoned choice
among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature and conse-
quences of his plea.'" Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973), quoting
Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir. 1970) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
The decision in Sieling was approved en banc by a majority of the court in de Kaplany
v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Masthers,
539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976). But see Grennett v. United States, 403 F.2d 928, 930
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
116. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
117. 62 111. 2d 329, 335, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976); see Commonwealth v. Leate,
327 N.E.2d 866, 870 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1975).
118. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1957); People v. Heral, 62
Ill. 2d 329, 335, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976).
119. See People v. Heral, 62 I1. 2d 329, 335, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976).
120. 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
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waiver of counsel must include the finding that the defendant is com-
petent to act as his own counsel.
121
Additionally, Sieling has been criticized as creating a class of
"semi-competent" defendants12 2-defendants who are competent to stand
trial, but who are incompetent to plead guilty. Sieling effectively denies
the "semi-competent" defendant the chance to engage in plea negotia-
tions and the possibility of a lesser penalty.
The Westbrook test, however, should apply to the defendant who
wishes to waive counsel and plead guilty. 12 Although a plea of guilty
does not involve all of the complexities of a trial, the defendant who
chooses to waive counsel and plead guilty must have the mental capa-
city to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's case,
to make pretrial motions, to conduct plea negotiations with the prosecu-
tion, to offer evidence in mitigation of punishment, and, if it becomes
necessary to do so, to withdraw his plea of guilty. Therefore, where a
defendant desires to plead guilty without counsel, the higher standard
of competency in Westbrook should apply.
Conclusion
Dusky v. United States sets forth the mental competency test for
standing trial and pleading guilty where the defendant is represented
by counsel. Under the Dusky test, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.
The mental competency test established in Westbrook v. Arizona
applies where the defendant desires to plead guilty or stand trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Under the Westbrook test, the trial court
must first determine whether the defendant is mentally competent to
stand trial under the Dusky test. If he is, the trial court must then deter-
mine whether he is competent to waive counsel and represent himself.
121. See notes 77-108 supra.
122. See de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1976) (Wallace,
J., concurring); People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 335, 342 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1976); see A
New Standard, supra note 5, at 170-71; cf. Commonwealth v. Leate, 327 N.E.2d 866, 870
Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1975).
123. See In re Williams, 165 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1958); cf. People v. Heral, 62
Ill. 2d 329, 342 N.E.2d 34 (1976).
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